The United Nations: Balancing High Ideals and Harsh Realities

October 24th marks United Nations Day, commemorating the moment in 1945 when the UN officially came into being, following the ratification of its Charter by the majority of signatories, including the five permanent Security Council members. Yet, this year, as the UN stands amid mounting crises—from Ukraine to the Middle East—questions swirl around its relevance and effectiveness. Criticism has intensified, with some even questioning whether the UN can still fulfill the vision set by its founders nearly 80 years ago.

The UN has always been held to high standards—maybe impossibly high ones. Its Charter lays out ideals like peace, human rights, and social progress. But today, in the face of major conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, criticism of the UN has reached a fever pitch. Israel has declared the UN Secretary-General persona non grata, and after his recent trip to the BRICS summit, whispers about the UN’s “uselessness” have turned into full-blown calls to dismantle the organization. Some even suggest Western countries withdraw altogether. Is this frustration justified, or are we expecting too much from an organization of 193 very different voices?

Who are the United Nations?

When you picture the UN, what comes to mind? Maybe that iconic East River building or the Security Council chamber with its massive semi-circular table. But these symbols don’t tell the full story. The UN is more than a few halls in New York. That building on the East River is primarily the UN Secretariat, a technical backbone supporting the real decision-making bodies: the General Assembly, Security Council, and Economic and Social Council.

Many people outside the UN mistakenly imagine the Secretary-General as a “World President,” when, in fact, he is the head of the Secretariat. The Secretariat exists to implement the decisions taken by the UN’s decision-making bodies: the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council. Its raison d’être is to carry out the directives of these main bodies—the “proper” United Nations, so to speak. Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN’s second Secretary-General, once said, “The UN is what its member nations make it.” That’s the rub. The decisions of the General Assembly, while morally significant, aren’t binding. It’s only in the Security Council that resolutions carry enforceable weight. This leads us to the second popular image of the United Nations: the UN Security Council Chamber.

The power and controversy of the veto

And here’s where things get complicated. The Security Council’s veto power, held by five permanent members—China, Russia, France, the UK, and the US—has always been controversial. Many see it as undemocratic, but to the UN’s founders, it was essential. Imagine 1945, world leaders desperately trying to build something stronger than the failed League of Nations. The veto was their answer, a tool for compromise to avoid escalating conflicts between powerful nations. At the San Francisco conference, the Big Five made it clear that without the veto power, there would be no UN. The US was a strong supporter of this mechanism. President Harry S. Truman wrote: “All our experts, civil and military, favored it, and without such a veto no arrangement would have passed the Senate.”

Amid recent calls to strip Russia and China of their veto power at the UN, it is crucial to revisit the rationale behind this mechanism. It plays a crucial role in promoting compromise among the most powerful nations, preventing potentially destructive unilateral actions, and encouraging dialogue. In the absence of the veto, it is argued that powerful states might resort to military means to resolve disputes rather than seeking peaceful or diplomatic solutions. The veto forces the permanent members of the Security Council to negotiate and find common ground, which, while imperfect, helps to de-escalate conflicts that might otherwise spiral into violence. This argument is often framed in terms of realpolitik, acknowledging that in a world of clashing national interests, the veto ensures no permanent member is compelled into decisions that threaten its core interests, thereby fostering cooperation.

A powerful example of the veto’s impact came during the Korean War. The Soviet Union, boycotting the Council over the exclusion of China, was absent, allowing the Council to authorize intervention in Korea. Had the USSR been present, the veto might have altered that outcome entirely.

As I explored in a previous blog post, the veto can also be seen as a tool for cost minimization. By using the veto, permanent members minimize the economic and political costs associated with military interventions or conflicts that could arise from being forced into unfavorable decisions. This cost-saving aspect is often overlooked in broader discussions of the veto’s role but remains central to understanding its continued relevance in international diplomacy.

Moreover, the founders (who were all men) considered the veto mechanism a cementing factor, essential for the UN’s continued existence. They believed it would prevent the breakdown of the United Nations itself if binding action were imposed against any of the permanent members. Given the disproportionate influence these powers hold globally, any attempt to bypass their interests could lead to their withdrawal from the institution altogether, potentially weakening or even dissolving the UN’s authority.

The toughest job in the world

The UN has undeniably failed to stop the war in Ukraine or the conflict in the Middle East. But can this be blamed on the Secretary-General? Without consensus in the Security Council, the Secretary-General has limited options. Furthermore, he must maintain a delicate balance in his relationships with the permanent members, who effectively hold the power to appoint him. It is also not unknown for the permanent members to treat the Secretary-General harshly when they perceive that person as overstepping their bounds, as was the case with Kofi Annan, who was severely rebuked by the United States for questioning the international legitimacy of NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999.

Contrary to popular belief that the toughest job in the world is that of the US President, the role of the UN Secretary-General is arguably even more challenging. He is under constant pressure to navigate and act upon many, often conflicting, interests. The Secretary-General’s responses to the Ukraine and Middle East conflicts underscore the difficult balance he must maintain as the UN’s top diplomat. While he has condemned the breach of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, he has refrained from explicitly criticizing Russia, much as he has avoided directly censuring Israel in the Middle East conflict. His recent statement on the escalating violence in the Middle East illustrates this delicate position: “I condemn the broadening of the Middle East conflict, with escalation after escalation. This must stop. We absolutely need a ceasefire.” As the Secretary-General, his role is to encourage peace without alienating key actors on either side. His restraint highlights the inherent limitations of his position; direct condemnation risks undermining his capacity as a neutral mediator, which is essential for maintaining diplomatic channels. The fact that he has now been declared persona non grata by Israel creates a cognitive dissonance for the Western leftist liberals, who support both Ukraine and Palestine: they are now in the impossible position of calling to ostracize someone for his stance on Ukraine, who has simultaneously been ostracized by Israel for his stance on Palestine—positions they otherwise support. Each statement he makes must consider the need to maintain open dialogue with all parties involved, weighing carefully the fine line between advocating for peace and risking accusations of bias from conflicting sides.

Another dilemma arose recently with his decision to attend the BRICS summit in Russia. Declining the invitation from President Putin might have earned him praise from Ukraine and its allies, but at the cost of alienating a bloc of countries that represents roughly half of the world’s population and about 30% of global GDP. When choosing between BRICS, representing nearly half of the global population, and the G7, which accounts for 10% of the population and 43% of global GDP, what should he prioritize? Given how diverse and contradictory the UN membership is, it is nearly impossible for the Secretary-General to meet all expectations. The job demands not only diplomacy but also an ability to manage inevitable criticism from all sides.

I can personally attest to this challenge, having met three very different Secretaries-General—Kofi Annan, Ban Ki-moon, and António Guterres—each with distinct personalities, yet facing the same pressure and constraints. Their agency was severely curtailed by the Security Council, and their forays into issues lacking consensus consistently drew criticism from different, sometimes diametrically opposed, sides. Of course, those Secretaries-General who explored the limits of their freedom less often had quieter tenures.

Failures and successes of the United Nations

There are many examples of the UN falling short of its members’ expectations, particularly in the Global South. One of the most notable examples is the structural adjustment programs implemented by the World Bank and IMF in developing countries during the 1980s–1990s. It is now widely recognized that these programs did more harm than good and may well be responsible for the “lost decade of growth” in Africa during the 1980s and for turning it into a “hopeless continent” in the 1990s. Indeed, the image of the UN building on the East River conceals another truth: the World Bank and IMF, both headquartered in Washington, DC, are specialized agencies under the UN Charter and part of the broader UN system.

Some of the UN’s failures are unforgettable—tragic, even. It failed to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995, and the genocide in Darfur from 2003 onward. These failures haunt the public memory. Yet, less often discussed is the steady, often invisible work that the UN’s agencies perform: providing health services, supporting livelihoods, creating jobs, and pushing for socio-economic equality.

A notable example of the UN’s impact—and its controversies—is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). For over 70 years, UNRWA has provided healthcare, education, and job support to Palestinians across the region, serving as a lifeline in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza. But UNRWA remains a deeply polarizing entity. Recently, the Israeli Knesset voted to ban its operations within Israel—an unprecedented move against a UN agency, which Israel initially supported upon its founding.

Is UNRWA pro-Palestinian? Of course. This is an agency that works day in and day out with Palestinians, dealing with their realities, struggles, and hardships. But does that make it anti-Israeli? My experience working with UNRWA in the West Bank suggests otherwise; while it’s true that many challenges UNRWA faces stem from Israeli policies, the agency’s leaders don’t promote anti-Semitism. However, isolated issues do exist. Former UNRWA Commissioner-General Peter Hansen once acknowledged that some employees sympathized with Hamas, though he clarified that the organization enforces strict neutrality among staff. Sadly, there have been documented instances where individual staff members engaged in anti-Semitic rhetoric, promoted extremist views, used UNRWA premises inappropriately or were directly involved in terrorist activities. Such incidents are tragic and must be condemned but do not mean that UNRWA itself is inherently aligned with terrorism, as is claimed by the Israeli government. The organization’s mission remains vital to stabilizing communities and fostering hope. UNRWA’s situation is challenging, and criticisms are fair in certain cases. Yet, these instances don’t define UNRWA’s fundamental mission: stabilizing communities and providing essential services where they are most needed.

UNRWA is one of over 30 UN agencies, from the World Food Programme to UNICEF and UNHCR, working tirelessly to make a difference. The iconic UN building also obscures this vast and varied UN system of affiliated organizations, programs, funds, and specialized agencies, each with its own membership, leadership, and budget processes. Several UN agencies, including the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNICEF, and the World Food Programme, have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The UN Peacekeeping Forces, which have been deployed in various global hotspots since 1947, also received the prize, as did the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was honored twice, in 1954 and 1981.

The last bridge: Preserving dialogue in a divided world

Despite its flaws and criticisms, the United Nations remains the only organization where every country in the world is represented. This gives the UN a unique status as a platform for discussion, collaboration, and compromise—not only among like-minded actors, as is often the case with organizations like the EU or NATO, but also among adversaries and even open enemies. The UN serves as a space where nations with deep-seated conflicts, such as the United States and Iran, can engage under the same roof. The very existence of this forum offers an invaluable opportunity for dialogue and diplomacy, even when prospects for agreement seem remote. It provides an essential buffer that prevents the breakdown of communication between hostile states, reducing the risk of conflict escalation. This unique role, where adversaries can at least discuss their differences rather than resort to force, remains one of the UN’s most critical contributions to international peace and security.

In this context, I disagree with recent proposals, such as those by Dominique Lazanski, which argue for disbanding the UN as an outdated, top-down institution and replacing it with a decentralized “system of federations,” as suggested by F.A. Hayek. These proposals, aiming to create federations of countries or territories united by common interests like trade or security, risk dangerously mirroring “friendshoring” and fostering geopolitical fragmentation. Such a system would create echo chambers—alliances that lack space for dissenting perspectives and promote division rather than global cooperation. This approach contrasts starkly with the UN’s core objective: fostering an inclusive platform where nations, despite their differences, work toward peaceful reconciliation and stability, rather than reinforcing opposing alliances.

Finally, when reflecting on the UN’s successes and failures, it is essential to return to its original mandate: to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” While the founders knew that preventing all future conflicts was unrealistic, their primary concern was to avert another world war on the scale of those they had experienced. By that measure, the United Nations has not yet failed—at least, not so far.